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Counterfeit electronic parts in the Department of Defense (DOD) supply chain undermine 
the operational readiness and performance of weapons systems, provide a competitive 
edge to adversaries, and put warfighters at risk. Consumer demand for products 
containing integrated circuits has risen dramatically. Electronics manufacturers leverage 
overseas production to reduce cost. The loss of the domestic semiconductor industry and 
a variety of DOD acquisition policies contributed to an environment that introduces risk 
of foreign manufactured components of unverifiable pedigree into many DOD systems. 
Current policy and statutory controls are inadequate to stem the growth of counterfeit and 
nonconforming parts in the DOD supply chain. This Joint Applied Project considers the 
history and scope of the counterfeit parts issue and its contributing factors, and proposes 
a tiered solution to more effectively ensure the safety, quality, and specification 
conformance of integrated circuit components. 
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A. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION 
Statutory measures designed to stem the flow of counterfeit electronic parts into 
the Department of Defense (DOD) supply chain are not effective at curbing the threat. 
Vendors are behind the threat curve. Control measures are designed to identify 
counterfeit parts after they have reached the customer, and are inadequate at addressing 
the core issues behind the problem. A joint contractor/government approach is required, 
in all phases of the acquisitions life cycle, in order to adequately address the problem. 
B. BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
Counterfeit electronics in the DOD supply chain undermine the operational 
readiness and performance of weapons systems, degrade the competitive edge that our 
weapons otherwise provide, and put warfighters at risk.   
Consumer demand for products that use integrated circuits has risen steadily since 
their invention; with the rise in demand, comes vendor pressure to maintain supply. 
Electronics manufacturers understood this in the early days of the industry, and shipped 
much of the production work overseas in order to capitalize on reduced labor costs. 
According to Rochester Electronics (2011), the foreign manufacture of integrated circuits 
opened the door to a risk that was not adequately mitigated upon its first identification, 
and is estimated to cost the American economy over $5 billion per year. It is also 
estimated that more than 2% of the total available semiconductor market is composed of 
counterfeit parts (Rochester Electronics, 2011, p. 2).  
The issue of counterfeit parts has now become a global concern in both the public 
and private sectors. The problem is especially serious for the DOD; with parts being 
manufactured in countries that have a tense relationship with the United States, while 
countries that are considered friendly to the United States act as infiltration points to 
United States markets (Rochester Electronics, 2011, p. 2). The United States bears much 
of the responsibility for perpetuating this problem through acquisitions policies that favor 
independent parts brokers, an ever-increasing service life for systems that require 
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replacement electronic parts, and a life cycle management plan that does not adequately 
account for disposal of nonconforming parts or retired systems (H.R. 1540, 2012). 
The DOD identified counterfeit parts risks to the supply chain as early as 1986, 
and has made attempts since that time to bound the problem of counterfeit parts (U.S. 
Department of Defense, 1986). There has been some success at the identification of the 
problem itself, but the actual numbers of counterfeit parts that are currently embedded in 
military systems is unknown, as is the actual number of counterfeit parts that are in a 
warehouse pending assembly into a military system.   
The latest attempt to combat the problem is in the form of congressional policy 
that directly addresses the issue at the prime contractor level. The 2012 National Defense 
Authorization Act Section 818 (H.R. 1540, 2012), and the subsequent Secretary of 
Defense memorandum (Kendall, 2012), provide the most comprehensive guidance to 
date, with specific statutory measures aimed at contractors who supply microcircuits to 
the DOD. These controls, however, fall short of the actions that are required to 
adequately combat the problem.  
This research intends to show that counterfeit electronics are a problem that 
cannot be solved by pushing the full identification and mitigation responsibility on the 
contractor. Rather, these parts need to be caught before they enter the contractor facility 
or DOD warehouse. The analysis presented will clearly demonstrate that there needs to 
be a focused, joint government and contractor effort to identify solutions that benefit 
both. The DOD needs to take active steps to combat this epidemic before inexpensive, 
nonconforming parts that accidentally find their way into United States combat systems 
are replaced with parts that are specifically targeted and designed to infiltrate and 
undermine the military‘s ability to defend. 
C. PROJECT DESCRIPTION AND APPROACH 
This project examines the history and scope of the counterfeit parts problem, 
assesses the adequacy of current policy and statutory controls, and proposes the 
development of a tiered strategy to address the issue. 
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II. SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM 
A. HISTORY 
Counterfeit parts have been an issue since the early days of the integrated circuit. 
The United States government has not addressed the problem until recently (U.S. 
Department of Defense, 1986), partly because the problem has not been adequately 
scoped. 
The early days of digital computing were relatively simple, consisting of large 
machines weighing several tons computing through the use of vacuum tubes. The 
computing took place when the tubes would amplify current and pass electrical signals 
from one part of the program to another. According to Nobelprize.org, the Nobel Prize 
official website, the first digital computer weighed 30 tons and used 18,000 vacuum tubes 
(Nobel Prize, 2014). An example of an early, typical room size computer is shown in 
Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1.  Early Vacuum Tube Computer. An early computer that incorporated 
the use of vacuum tubes is shown. Large ceiling air ducts were 
required to keep the vacuum tubes of this unit cool (from Historic 
Computer Images, 2013). 
 4 
The invention of the transistor in 1947 revolutionized the world of computing. 
Transistors function the same way as vacuum tubes, but are much smaller, less prone to 
burning out, and provided engineers a new way to think about computing design (Nobel 
Prize, 2014). Without the anchor of the vacuum tubes, engineers began to conceive of 
advanced processing machines, but there was an existing problem with the circuits of the 
day (Nobel Prize, 2014). Each circuit required hand assembly and soldering of each 
individual component in order to form the necessary connections to complete the circuit 
(Nobel Prize, 2014). A single circuit was labor intensive and a simple mistake would 
cause the whole circuit to fail (Nobel Prize, 2014).   
In 1958, an engineer working at Texas Instruments had the idea to place the 
whole circuit on a single piece of semi-conductive material; with this idea, the need for 
individual soldering of connections and long production times was completely negated 
(Nobel Prize, 2014). All the transistors, resistors, capacitors, and diodes which form a 
chip, were integrated into a single block, which was reproducible through an automated 
manufacturing process (Nobel Prize, 2014).   
The invention of the integrated circuit brought about a transformation in computer 
hardware development, manufacturing, and associated software design. The ability to 
pack the same computing power that previously required 18,000 vacuum tubes onto a 
small microchip was a milestone for hardware development, but the fact that it could be 
mass produced and used interchangeably meant that computing was accessible to the 
masses (Nobel Prize, 2014). Stages in the evolution of the modern microprocessor are 




Figure 2.  Evolution of the Microprocessor. Left: Vacuum tube pictured next to 
an early transistor (from Nobel Prize, 2014). Center: Representation 
of a common transistor (from Nobel Prize, 2014). Right: The scale 
of this microprocessor is evident as it sits on a stack of pennies (from 
How Microprocessors Work, 2013). 
Engineers quickly realized the possibilities if these microchips were placed into 
weapons systems. The creation of ―smart-weapons‖ was underway, with each system 
having its own autonomous decision making logic on board. DOD much preferred smart 
weapons for the functionality they added in the form of precision guidance systems, 
diagnostic outputs, and reduced loss of non-combatant lives. Strictly from a size 
perspective, the Space, Weight, Power, and Cooling (SWPaC) requirements for these 
new microchips and the systems into which they were incorporated greatly decreased the 
footprint of the platforms on which these were installed. The reduced SWPaC footprint 
meant that faster systems, and more of them, could be placed where one computer was 
previously housed. An example of a large shipboard computer with substantial SWPaC 
requirements is shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3.  USS Missouri Fire Control Computer. The USS Missouri was 
commissioned in 1945 and was retired from service in 1992. This 
fire control computer was designed in 1941. The same type of 
computer for a modern-day ARLEIGH BURKE class Guided 
Missile Destroyer takes up a fraction of a commercial blade server 
rack (from Rumberg, 2013). 
B. GOVERNMENT/INDUSTRY DATA EXCHANGE PROGRAM (GIDEP) 
As early as 1980, there were indications that some of the parts used in operational 
weapons systems were not performing to their required standard; these parts were 
referred to as ―non-conforming‖ (U.S. Department of Defense, 1986). The existence of 
non-conforming parts and the implication that the reliability of the weapons system 
would not function according to the specifications caused concern, and prompted the 
development of the 1986 MIL-STD-1556B, which set guidelines for contractor 
participation in the Government/Industry Data Exchange Program (GIDEP). The purpose 
of the GIDEP was to provide 
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a cooperative data interchange among Government and industry 
participants seeking to reduce or eliminate expenditures of time and 
money by making maximum use of existing knowledge.  ...Information 
contained within the GIDEP storage and retrieval system includes 
environmental test reports and procedures, reliability specifications, 
failure analysis data, failure rate data, calibration procedures, and other 
technical information related to the application, reliability, quality 
assurance, and testing of parts and related materials. (U.S. Department of 
Defense, 1986, p. iii)   
Though the problem of counterfeit parts had not been identified or specifically 
addressed at this point, the GIDEP was the first step towards quantifying the problem of 
non-conforming parts within the DOD supply chain. In section 5.3.2 of MIL-STD-
1556B, it is stated that contractor participation is voluntary unless contractually stipulated 
(U.S. Department of Defense, 1986, p. 7).   
There was an obvious reluctance on the part of the contractor to voluntarily report 
non-conforming parts for fear that their quality control practices or suppliers would be 
brought into question. There was no monitoring program in place to ensure contractor 
participation, and there was no monitoring program in place to ensure their sub-
contractors participated. Additionally, there was no quality assurance standard that had to 
be met.   
Ten years after its inception, MIL-STD-1556B was formally cancelled as part of 
DOD Acquisition reforms, and has not been replaced. The 1996 cancellation notice did 
provide details as to the location of the GIDEP operations manual and suggested 
contractual language for the future use of the system, but the formal guidelines that 
governed the contractual use of GIDEP had been suspended (U.S. Department of 
Defense, 1996, p. 1). Though the 1986 standard fell short of accurately quantifying the 
issue of counterfeit parts, it did lay the groundwork for cross-agency collaboration to 
combat a problem that was largely not understood. As of 2015, participation in GIDEP by 
industry members is entirely voluntary, and represents ―a cooperative activity between 
government and industry participants seeking to reduce or eliminate expenditures of 
resources by sharing technical information‖ (GIDEP Home Page, 2015, para. 1).  
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C. POST-MIL-STD-1556B POLICY GAP 
Although no longer documented in a formal MIL-STD, DOD had taken notice of 
the importance of microelectronics, as well as the possible vulnerabilities that were 
introduced as a result of the extensive use and dependence upon them. The Defense 
Science Board (DSB) issued a 1992 report titled Microelectronics Research Facilities.   
In that report, the DSB reached a conclusion, as reported to the director for defense 
research and engineering, that: ―DOD needs a strong microelectronic science and 
technology program which encourages diversity and innovation in all phases from 
research through system development and support. The objective of this program should 
be to assure Defense Department access to and insertion of microelectronics technology 
to support its needs‖ (Defense Science Board, 1992, p. 5).   
The DSB had identified the need for the United States to remain the leader in 
technological development, and pinpointed the ―pervasive, enabling‖ effects of 
microelectronics on DOD systems. The DSB report went a step further and called upon 
DOD to create a single research facility, combining Tri-Service approaches to the 
development and incorporation of microelectronics technology. Their fear in 1992 was 
the increasing global demand for microelectronics, and the threat that the United States 
would no longer be at the forefront of the technological curve. The DSB suggested high 
level DOD oversight that would ensure industry would continue to provide reliable 
access to critical technologies, and provide ―smart-buyer‖ capabilities to keep the United 
States at the forefront of technological proficiencies (Defense Science Board, 1992, p. 7).   
The major threat to the United States was noted as early as 2005, when the DSB 
issued a report, High Performance Microchip Supply. In this report, they identified the 
growth of global demand for integrated circuits and discrete electronic parts had risen, 
which put pressure on industry to reduce labor costs and to spread production risks across 
a broader area (Defense Science Board, 2005). In order to respond to this need, chip 
makers, who were predominately located in the United States, moved their production 
operations overseas, as noted by the National Academy of Engineering:   
In the semiconductor industry, some steps (e.g., assembly, packaging, and 
testing) in the manufacturing process have long been globalized. In recent 
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years, more sophisticated steps, such as wafer fabrication, have followed 
suit. Off shoring of semiconductor design is also increasing rapidly, in 
fact, 18 of the top 20 U.S.-based companies have opened design centers in 
India, nine of them since 2004. (National Academy of Engineering, 
Committee on the Offshoring of Engineering, 2008, p. 34)  
In 2005, the DSB again called upon the DOD to protect the technical leadership 
of the United States in order to 
ensure that the United States maintains reliable access to the full spectrum 
of microelectronics components, from commodity and legacy, to state-of-
the-art parts, and application-specific Integrated Circuits special 
technologies. These activities must provide assurance that each 
component‘s trustworthiness (confidentiality, integrity, and availability) is 
consistent with that component‘s military application. (Defense Science 
Board, 2005, p. 52)  
More importantly, they took note of the need for long term planning and focus in 
the acquisition of critical technologies that require the use of microelectronics: ―DOD 
needs a focused, tailored acquisition plan, driven by a long-term vision of its 
semiconductor needs, to establish the basis, policy and operating guidelines for DOD-
enabled access to trusted foundry services by the defense department, its contractors, and 
others‖ (Defense Science Board, 2005, p. 56).  
Despite all the intra-governmental warnings and indications of possible systemic 
vulnerabilities to the microchip supply line, the issue first garnered national attention in 
2008 when Business Week published an article titled Dangerous Fakes – How 
Counterfeit, Defective Computer Components from China are Getting into U.S. 
Warplanes and Ships (Grow, Tschang, Edwards, & Burnsed, 2008). The article identifies 
major flaws in DOD acquisitions and specifically cites China as a source of the problem 
and provider of non-conforming parts.   
D. SCOPING THE PROBLEM 
The problem of counterfeits had been publicly identified and acknowledged, but 
the full scope was not understood until the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry 
and Security (BIS) published their Defense Industrial Base Assessment for Counterfeit 
Electronics in 2010 (U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, 
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Office of Technology Evaluation, 2010). This report was the first attempt to turn the 
problem of counterfeit parts from anecdotal information to definitive facts.   
Spanning a four year period, BIS reported that nearly 40% of survey respondents 
(inclusive of manufacturers, distributors, assemblers, and contractors) had encountered 
counterfeit parts. Additionally, the detection rate for counterfeits had risen from 3,868 in 
2005 to 9,365 in 2008. Of those parts that are most counterfeited, microcircuits and their 
components represent the highest frequency of occurrence. One of the primary reasons 
for this rise, as noted by BIS, is quite simply that weapons systems life cycles are 
extending well beyond their initial service life, which makes genuine replacement parts 
increasingly more difficult to acquire. The counterfeiting of low-cost and comparatively 
low tech components both, makes the practice more accessible in developing nations and 
makes the modified parts more commonplace in the supply chain (U.S. Department of 
Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, Office of Technology Evaluation, 2010). As 






Figure 4.  Counterfeit Incidents by Product Resale Value, OCMs (2005-2008). 
This graph shows the average value of individual counterfeited parts 
during 2005–2008. Most counterfeited parts cost $10.00 USD or 
less. These are small components that are incorporated in the 
subsystem and system levels of products, and often go unnoticed 
(from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and 
Security, Office of Technology Evaluation, 2010,  
p. 12). 
The Original Component Manufacturer (OCM) is the manufacturer of discrete 
electronic parts, and primarily supplies those parts to Original Equipment Manufacturers 
(OEM), prime and subcontractors, and entities of the United States government that 
incorporate them into systems. As noted by the BIS, OCMs and OEMs sell their products 
to authorized distributors, independent distributors, and parts brokers, which in turn sell 
those products to a wide variety of customers.   Distributors act as middle-men, finding 
the ―out of production‖ parts for their customers, but there are many different flavors of 
distributor:   
Authorized distributors are companies that have exclusive rights with an 
OCM or OEM to market, store, and ship OCM/OEM Products, subject to 
legal conditions set by the manufacturers. Conversely, independent 
distributors and brokers sell parts acquired from various entities without 
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an exclusive OCM/OEM agreement to do so. Independent distributors 
tend to maintain inventories and have controlled environments for parts 
storage. Brokers tend to be smaller firms and normally do not have 
inventory or controlled environments. (U.S. Department of Commerce, 
Bureau of Industry and Security, Office of Technology Evaluation, 2010, 
p. 39)  
 
Figure 5.  United States Defense Electronic Parts Supply Chain. This depicts 
the basic flow of electronic parts between OCMs, distributors, 
assemblers, and contractors prior to delivery to DOD Components 
(from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and 
Security, Office of Technology Evaluation, 2010, p. 4). 
As there is no inventory maintained by independent parts brokers, there is a risk 
that parts will get shipped directly from source-to-depot, without any verification checks 
or independent testing.   An example of the dangers surrounding independent brokers is 
highlighted in Bloomberg Business:  
She (Hakimuddin) began brokering military chips four years ago, after 
friends told her about the expanding trade. Since 2004 she has won 
Pentagon contracts worth a total of $2.7 million, records show. The 
military has acquired microchips and other parts from IT Enterprise for 
use in radar on the aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan and the 
antisubmarine combat system of Spruance-class destroyers.  
Hakimuddin says she knows little about the parts she has bought and sold. 
She started her business by signing up on the Internet for a Government 
supplier code. After the Defense Dept. approved her application, with no 
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inspection, she began scanning online military procurement requests. She 
plugged part codes into Google and found Websites offering low prices. 
Then she ordered parts and had them shipped directly to military depots. 
―I wouldn‘t know what [the parts] were before I‘d order them,‖ she says, 
standing near her front door. ―I didn‘t even know what the parts were for.‖ 
(Grow, Tschang, Edwards, & Burnsed, 2008) 
There was no verification of MIL-SPEC conformance, there was no pedigree 
paperwork associated with this transaction, and there was no independent parts 
inspection. It is highly likely that those parts, destined for the radar of the USS Ronald 
Reagan, shipped directly from China to the radar assembly plant. Once received in the 
assembly plant, the manager likely assumed the parts were all conforming, and likely put 
them directly into the production line (Grow, Tschang, Edwards, & Burnsed, 2008).   
While the BIS survey helped the United States to gain some understanding as to 
the possible amount of counterfeit parts that are likely to be in the supply line, the Senate 
Armed Services Committee (SASC) provided the details as to their means of infiltration 
in their 2012 report titled Inquiry into Counterfeit Electronic Parts in the Department of 
Defense Supply Chain (U.S. Senate Committe on Armed Services, 2012). 
The SASC identified the United Kingdom and Canada as major infiltration points 
for counterfeit material into the United States, with China as the primary origination point 
of manufacture for counterfeit electronics. The report further noted that the Chinese 
counterfeiting market is deep-rooted, enjoys strong support from the people of China, and 
is in no danger of shut-down by the Chinese government. According to the SASC, the 
raw materials that are used by Chinese counterfeiters are obtained through recycled 
electronic waste that mostly originates in the United States (U.S. Senate Committe on 
Armed Services, 2012).  
In theory, the recycling of electronic waste is an ethical environmental decision. 
An older, functional integrated circuit that was formerly used in an obsolete computer can 
be turned around and used for a lower level application that does not have the same 
performance requirements (calculators, home appliances); however, some scrap recycling 
companies realize profits when they send their raw materials to Hong Kong for disposal 
(U.S. Senate Committe on Armed Services, 2012). From there, electronic waste is put on 
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trucks and shipped into mainland China, where the electronic devices are taken apart for 
scrap, sorted, cleaned, re-labeled, and in most cases, re-sold as new products to 
independent brokers, which eventually make their way back to the United States (U.S. 
Senate Committe on Armed Services, 2012).    
The SASC survey included testimony from industry representatives who traveled 
to China to witness the counterfeiting markets first hand.   
While there, I witnessed e-scrap piled outside of buildings throughout 
large areas of the town, throughout the outskirts of the town, used 
electronic parts being washed in a river, and laid on the riverbank to dry, 
Nylon sacks with harvested components being dumped onto sidewalks and 
sorted by women and children, laid out there for the monsoon rains of July 
to wash them naturally, cardboard and plastic bins filled with expensive 
brand name components and harvested from scrap printed circuit boards 
ready for processing. (U.S. Senate Committe on Armed Services, 2012, 
p. 6) 
E. TECHNIQUES 
Counterfeiting is not relegated to villagers on the sides of a riverbank. According 
to SASC Testimony, in the Guangdong Province, there are entire factories dedicated to 
the counterfeiting industry, some of which employ 10,000 – 15,000 people. In these 
factories, circuit boards are processed and made to look original through a variety of 
means. The pins on the circuit are straightened, and labels are changed to indicate a new 
or higher performing part numbers (U.S. Senate Committe on Armed Services, 2012). 
The most common form of counterfeiting is a process called ―Blacktopping,‖ where the 
old part is given a fresh coat of paint that looks indistinguishable from the original paint 
to the average purchaser (Villasenor & Tehranipoor, 2013). 
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Figure 6.  Counterfeit Microcircuit Incidents by Type of Problem (2005-2008). 
This graph shows the types of counterfeiting that are prevalent for 
microcircuits. Note the sharp increase in products that are marked as 
higher grade, and the relatively low number of ―seconds‖ from scrap. 
This is attributable to the increasing sophistication of the 
counterfeiting industry in China, and the ease with which relabeling 
occurs (from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and 
Security, Office of Technology Evaluation, 2010, p. 16). 
The counterfeiting market in China is sophisticated, and has shown an ability to 
adapt and change as needed to avoid detection. For example, a simple test to see if a chip 
has been blacktopped is to run an acetone soaked swab over the top of it to see if paint 
comes off. This worked until 2009 when a company discovered that counterfeiters had 
developed a paint that more closely resembled the chemistry of the original paint, thereby 
making the swab test invalid (Villasenor & Tehranipoor, 2013).  
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Figure 7.  Blacktopping Example. This integrated circuit component was 
identified as counterfeit during visual inspection. The application of 
paint over the OCM‘s logo is an example of the blacktopping 
technique (from Government Accountability Office, 2010, p. 16). 
The counterfeit market in China is big business, and affects the American bottom 
line in more ways than one. There is no effort to hide this practice in China; in fact, it is 
considered to be an acceptable business model in the Guangdong Province (Kirk, 2011). 
Further, counterfeit parts are often shipped from China to other nations that participate in 
the manufacture of legitimate components and subsystems; buying a system from an ally 
does not guarantee the pedigree of its parts (Kirk, 2011). 
F. DETECTION 
The parts ordered by DOD have distinct purposes, and have stated performance 
requirements documented in military specifications and standards. When counterfeit parts 
are put into a subsystem of a fighter jet, for example, they may work with little indication 
of a problem to the pilot; however, there may come a time when the old circuit cannot 
meet the demands of a modern weapons system. The circuit board that controls a 
subsystem within the plane (e.g., Global Positioning System (GPS), landing gear, 
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targeting computer) may fail, causing anything from a minor annoyance to the pilot, to a 
potentially catastrophic full systematic shutdown or lockout.    
Real life examples of this issue can be found in open United States government 
sources. One example from GAO Report 10–389 relates to Air Force GPS systems: 
Oscillators used for navigation on over 4,000 Air Force and Navy systems 
experienced a high failure rate and failed a retest. These oscillators were 
provided by a supplier that Global Positioning System engineers had 
previously disapproved as a supply source. Air Force officials stated that 
while the failure would not cause a safety-of-flight issue, it could prevent 
some unmanned systems from returning from their missions. (U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, 2010, p. 7) 
There is no single test to determine if a part is counterfeit. As shown in Figure 8, 
the authentication process may pass one or two individual tests, but may still be found to 




Figure 8.  Comparison of Counterfeit Detection Techniques. DOD frequently 
orders rare and obsolete military grade components to support older 
in-service systems. This graphic shows a comparison of analysis 
techniques applied to seven requested authentic parts. All were 
found to be counterfeit (from Government Accountability Office, 
2012, p. 6). 
G. SUMMARY 
The counterfeit parts problem is known, proven, and has been demonstrated 
operationally within DOD. The various studies and reports on this issue provide proposed 
steps to counteract the problem, but most represent a retroactive look at the dilemma of 
counterfeit parts. Counterfeiting is an ever changing marketplace, rendering the current 
control measures inadequate. This changing landscape was well illustrated by Raytheon‘s 
Vice President of Supply Chain Operations, as quoted in the 2012 SASC report: 
What keeps us up at night is the dynamic nature of this threat because by 
the time we‘ve figured out how to test for these counterfeits, they‘ve 
figured out how to get around it. And it‘s literally on almost a daily basis 
 19 
they change and the sophistication of the counterfeiting is amazing to us. 
We‘re finding that you have to go down to the microns to be able to figure 
out that it‘s actually a counterfeit. (U.S. Senate Committe on Armed 
Services, 2012, p. 7) 
There is still no indication of how many illegitimate parts reside within 
operational systems, or on shelves at DOD warehouses.   
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III. INSUFFICIENCY OF CURRENT CONTROLS 
A. NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 
The counterfeiting control measures that have recently been proposed for DOD 
provide a strong starting point against this dynamic threat. The first of these is a 2012 
amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) Section 818. This 
guidance provides broad solutions to detect and avoid counterfeit electronic parts in all 
stages of the acquisitions life cycle.   
Within NDAA Section 818, the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) is called upon to 
provide a department-wide definition of the terms ―counterfeit electronic part‖ and 
―suspect counterfeit electronic part‖ (H.R. 1540, 2012). Until this mandate, there was no 
clear, legally binding definition of these terms, and each particular agency, group, or task 
force would provide their own definition depending on the specific circumstances of their 
investigation (H.R. 1540, 2012).    
B. 2012 IMPLEMENTATION MEMORANDUM 
Based on this requirement, the Acting Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD AT&L), Frank Kendall, provided guidance 
in a March 2012 memorandum, which acted as a broadcast identification of the problem, 
with mitigating steps that DOD agencies should follow in advance of the identification of 
counterfeit parts, as well as steps to be taken after the identification of a counterfeit part.   
Kendall provided the following as his definition:  ―For the purposes of this 
memorandum, counterfeit material is defined as ‗an item that is an unauthorized copy or 
substitute that has been identified, marked, and/or altered by a source other than the 
item‘s legally authorized source and has been misrepresented to be an authorized item of 
the legally authorized source‘‖ (Kendall, 2012, p. 1).  
This is a strong definition, but the NDAA focuses its emphasis on counterfeit 
electronic parts, whereas AT&L provides broader guidance that extends to other materiel. 
Specificity is lacking for certain circumstances, for example, when a previously 
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authorized part becomes counterfeit. That is to say, when a computer that was once part 
of a DOD computing suite is sent off to be recycled, there is a risk that it will get into the 
hands of an illicit recycling operation. DOD must define the difference between a 
microprocessor that was once legitimate (and may still be legitimate for older platforms) 
and one that is straight counterfeit.  
In addition to this, the NDAA Section 818 (b) (4) calls upon SECDEF to establish 
processes for ensuring that Department personnel issue reports in writing within 60 days 
of the identification of a possible counterfeit part incident. Additionally, this reporting 
should be done via the GIDEP or ―similar program designated by the secretary‖ (H.R. 
1540, 2012).   
The 2012 AT&L memo provides 10 points for department-wide action. Of those 
10, point 7 calls out the GIDEP as the central reporting site:  ―Ensure contractors and 
subcontractors reports of suspected or confirmed counterfeit items are entered into the 
Government-Industry Data Exchange Program (GIDEP) system, which will serve as the 
DOD central reporting repository‖ (Kendall, 2012, p. 1). 
C. GIDEP INSUFFICIENCY 
Though designated as the repository for all suspected counterfeit parts data, the 
GIDEP reports suspected counterfeit parts as ―Failure Experience Data‖ which prompts 
one of several types of reports: Alerts, Safe-Alerts, Problem Advisories, and Agency 
Action Notices (Government-Industry Data Exchange Program, 2009). These failure 
notices are received and disseminated to all GIDEP participants—several thousand in 
total—via the online GIDEP portal. 
Some of these alerts may not be issued at all for two reasons. First, due to the 
sensitive nature of the end-user system information, some alerts must be redacted for 
classification prior to submission, which makes them of little or no value to the end user. 
Second, the supplier in question may be part of an ongoing investigation; if they are a 
GIDEP participant, then they will receive the alert, which will counteract the work of the 
investigators.  
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In most acquisition programs, prime contractors are contractually required to 
participate in the GIDEP program. However, self-reporting suspected counterfeit parts is 
the only way for a broader alert to be issued, and there is very little oversight to guide the 
levels of participation or reporting.  
D. INDUSTRY CONTROLS 
The NDAA Section 818 stipulates that contractors will not be subject to civil 
liability when they have made a reasonable effort to determine whether a counterfeit part 
was present. It is noteworthy that four years prior to enactment of 2012 NDAA, Grow, et 
al reflected the reluctance of contractors to use the GIDEP to report suspected 
counterfeits:   
[BAE‘s U.S. Division] has reported far more counterfeiting incidents than 
its rivals: 45 over the past three years. Industry executives say that large 
figure may reflect BAE‘s candor or its aggressive pursuit of low-priced 
chips from China. The Justice Department is investigating BAE‘s military 
electronic-parts procurement. This willingness to comply with reporting 
requirements could, in turn, cast doubt on the nature of a specific 
contractor‘s procurement practices when in fact, the problems are seen 
industry-wide. (Grow, Tschang, Edwards, & Burnsed, 2008, p. 2) 
NDAA Section 818 (c)(3) requires DOD contractors to detect and avoid the use of 
counterfeit electronic parts and ―whenever possible‖ to obtain parts from original 
manufacturers or trusted suppliers. For parts that are hard to find or out of production, the 
trusted supplier is to notify DOD of the need to obtain the part from a source other than 
the authorized one. Upon receipt of the part, the prime contractor is to perform stronger 
verification testing through a DOD-approved testing program. There is no standard for 
implementation associated with this requirement (H.R. 1540, 2012). 
Further, Section 818 (d) requires that the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) establish a risk-based methodology for the targeting of counterfeit electronic parts 
as they cross the border. This may alleviate some detection responsibility on the part of 
industry vendors who source parts from suppliers under DHS investigation H.R. 1540, 
2012). 
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The NDAA falls short with Section 818 (e)(2)(A)(iii), where contractors are given 
specific guidance to establish policies and procedures that will ―abolish counterfeit parts 
proliferation.‖  This statement is far too broad to be of value (H.R. 1540, 2012).   
Additionally, Section 818 (e)(2)(A)(v) mandates the use of mechanisms that 
enable the traceability of parts, but tracing the full pedigree of a part can be quite difficult 
(H.R. 1540, 2012).  As noted by the SASC, each part could be sent through several 
different distributors before they reach an authorized one (U.S. Senate Committe on 
Armed Services, 2012). At that point, the part may be embedded within a functional sub-
assembly. To test the part would require disassembly of the entire system, which in itself 
could destroy the electronic components.   
While the NDAA and the AT&L memo are both very clear about the need to use 
covered contractors and trusted suppliers, there is a loophole that may still allow the 
independent distributor to operate. According to the Task Force on Counterfeit Parts of 
the Committee on Acquisition Reform and Emerging Issues of the American Bar 
Association, the term ‗Covered Contractor‘ as pertains to Section 818 and the 2012 
AT&L memo, refers to a contractor that is subject to the Cost Accounting Standard 
(CAS), thus leaving a threshold below which an independent supplier may be exempt: 
It is unclear whether acceptance of only one contract subject to CAS 
would render a contractor the kind of CAS-covered contractor that will be 
subject to these requirements. Applicability of these requirements to CAS 
covered contractors likely will cover all major defense contractors and will 
require these entities to flow down counterfeit avoidance and detection 
requirements to their subcontractors. Contractors that are not subject to 
CAS, such as commercial item contractors or small businesses, apparently 
would not fall within this ‗CAS-Covered Contractor‘ group. (American 
Bar Association Section Task Force on Counterfeit Parts, 2012, p. 15) 
Therefore, the acquisition policies which favor small businesses would allow for a 
technical loophole from all pieces of the NDAA that pertain to counterfeit parts control. 
Either the NDAA should be amended to include all contractors and contract types, or the 
acquisitions policies should be updated to promote the strongest part pedigree instead of 
the lowest price, technically acceptable.   
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E. SUMMARY 
The NDAA and AT&L memo both make a strong attempt to bound and quantify 
the problem, but the means to combat the problem are lacking. The GIDEP is an existing 
tool that is being re-purposed from its original 1986 MIL-STD to fit the current need. The 
use of GIDEP presents its own set of challenges including the ease and accountability of 
reporting suspected counterfeit parts.     
According to the 2005 DSB report, ―a reexamination of economic models for 
producing low-volume products will require a joint government/industry program to 
develop new, more flexible factory technology capable of meeting both defense and 
commercial needs‖ (Defense Science Board, 2005, p. 4). 
2012 control measures fail to provide the intended solution. Most of the reporting 
responsibility has been pushed to the contractor to verify a part‘s pedigree prior to end 
delivery, but there is no effort to provide a useful, joint, government and industry solution 
that provides real time guidance and alerts to this rapidly changing threat.   
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IV. SOLUTION DEVELOPMENT 
A. DESIGNED FAILURE 
An immediate solution is required, as the DOD has already experienced the 
counterfeit parts problems from inexpensive non-conforming parts that accidentally find 
their way into the supply chain, to those parts that are specifically designed to infiltrate 
and undermine United States weapon systems. 
The threat posed by failing parts is serious; as Lieutenant General Patrick 
O‘Reilly stated during his tenure as the Director of the Missile Defense Agency, ―We do 
not want a $12 million missile defense interceptor‘s reliability compromised by a $2 
counterfeit part‖ (U.S. Senate Committe on Armed Services, 2012, p. i). More serious 
than the risk of a non-conforming part, is the threat found at the intersection of prolific 
inexpensive non-conforming microchips, and strategic placement of software within that 
microchip designed to fail at a particular point. The possibility of that threat was 
enhanced when chip-makers began to send offshore their operations in order to realize 
higher profits and increase supply. The 2005 DSB report identified this as a major 
vulnerability, and specifically noted the threat of having a Trojan horse program 
imbedded within the integrated circuits that are being included in United States Weapon 
Systems: ―such backdoor features could be used by an adversary to disrupt military 
systems at critical times‖ (Defense Science Board, 2005, p. 23). Additionally, when one 
considers the increasing interoperability and interconnectedness of intra-service platforms 
as well as cross-service weapon systems, the threat of a single virus affecting many users 
is amplified. 
The implications of offshoring chip making are serious. The most telling quote 
can be found in the 2005 DSB report, which states the following:   
From a U.S. national security view, the potential effects of this restructuring are 
so perverse and far reaching and have such opportunities for mischief that, had the 
United States not significantly contributed to this migration, it would have been 
considered a major triumph of an adversary nation‘s strategy to undermine U.S. 
military capabilities. (Defense Science Board, 2005, p. 15) 
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Modern weaponry has a voracious appetite for integrated circuitry. Every 
platform contains several integrated circuits; an airplane, for example, has at least one 
circuit which controls the avionics computer, at least one that controls the heads-up 
display, and at least one that is specific to fire control (to name a few). An integrated 
circuit that fails will not cause the entire platform (airplane) to fail, but it will cause the 
particular subsystem which it controls to fail. The true threat is when an adversary knows 
parts are headed for a DOD system and places code within that circuit in order to cause a 
failure.   
When contracting for electronic parts, if end-user information is passed along 
with the order, then it is relatively easy to deduce the types of software that can be used 
to interfere with the operation of the platform. For example, if contract information gets 
passed with the order which states Boeing is the end user, then the safe assumption would 
be that these chips are likely to end up in an airplane (either commercial or military), 
potentially interfering with the proper operation of that aircraft.   
The enemy hacker potentially could embed a code within a batch of integrated 
circuits that targets the communications system. This code could be written such that the 
entire communications system would fail if a predetermined GPS coordinate is passed.     
There is anecdotal evidence that suggests this might have already become a 
reality. A 2008 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) article titled The 
Hunt for the Kill Switch tells the story of Israeli jets bombing a suspected nuclear 
installation within Syria (Adee, 2008, p. 1). According to Adee, the state-of-the-art 
Syrian radar did not pick up on the incoming strike. It is widely believed that the function 
of the radar had been blocked by a back-door code embedded within one of the radar 
chips during fabrication, and that this code caused the Syrian radar to cease functioning 
as the Israeli jets approached (Adee, 2008, p. 2).   
Stronger than anecdotal evidence is the United States patent for an integrated 
circuit that has radio frequency code embedded within it. An excerpt from the patent 
abstract: 
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An integrated circuit device is provided for attachment to a target. The 
integrated circuit is controllable to effect an action at the target, such as 
activating or deactivating the usefulness of the target. The integrated 
circuit has a logic and memory section connected to an antenna for 
receiving communications from an associated reader or scanner. The 
integrated circuit also has a component constructed to transition from a 
first state to a permanent second state. The integrated circuit also stores a 
hidden secret kill code, and upon receiving a matching kill code from the 
reader, permanently transitions the component to its second state. When 
the component is in the permanent second state, the integrated circuit is 
incapable of effecting the action on the target. The integrated circuit may 
also verify its function is disabled, and report a kill confirmation to the 
reader. (Atkinson & Conero, 2006, p. 1) 
The United States has already seen the implications of malicious code on secure 
hardware devices. In 2008, a much publicized breach of DOD systems occurred wherein 
a foreign entity placed a simple piece of code on a flash drive which allowed a foreign 
security service to enter any system and read any file. That single piece of code on a 
single flash drive caused a massive data breach on both classified and unclassified 
networks; the cleanup effort was dubbed ―Operation Buckshot Yankee‖ and took 
approximately 14 months to complete. This moment was a wakeup call to the DOD and 
brought about the wider realization that the United States needed to take definitive action 
against this rapidly evolving cyber threat (Nakashima, 2010).     
It was not until 2010 that the U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) was made 
operational with the specific mission to conduct full spectrum military cyberspace 
operations (U.S. Cyber Command, 2014, para. 1). What is not clear, however, is the 
position that USCYBERCOM takes with regards to counterfeit hardware. Their focus is 
on information assurance and network reliability, but there is no obvious emphasis on 
bridging the gap between hardware pedigree and software reliability (U.S. Cyber 
Command, 2014, para. 4).   
One mitigation strategy has been implemented via the Defense Microelectronics 
Activity (DMEA). DMEA has initiated a trusted foundry program, which is designed to 
provide uninterrupted access to the microprocessors that are used by the United States 
Military. This is accomplished by identifying foundry partners that are reliable, and have 
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been vetted through the DMEA trusted foundry criteria (Defense Microelectronics 
Activity Trusted Foundry Program, 2014). 
 
Figure 9.  Trusted Supplier Accreditation Process. This describes the DMEA 
Trusted Supplier Accreditation Process. There is no obvious 
verification or reevaluation process after certification is achieved 
(from Defense Microelectronics Activity, 2014). 
Ideally, once a supplier is passed through this trusted foundry program, they will 
provide microprocessors that do not require heavy validation and invasive testing to 
determine part pedigree. The assumption is that a trusted foundry, especially one within 
the United States, will not produce parts that are harmful to the United States. However, 
this does not prevent a malefactor, insider threat, or disgruntled employee from creating a 
code and embedding it within a chip.   
From the hardware perspective, the NDAA Section 818 is designed to identify 
counterfeits at multiple contractor levels, after delivery has been accepted by the prime 
contractor, and ideally before delivery is made to the Government. However, due to a 
variety of factors, only a fraction of these parts are identified, and of those identified 
parts, only a fraction can be traced back to their source. Identification of the counterfeit 
often comes after the part is already embedded within the platform, which causes extra 
time and cost to disassemble, repair, and reassemble.   
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With regard to software, the testing required to verify a circuit is free from illicit 
code is extremely time-consuming, and when considering an order size of several 
thousand chips, it is both time and cost prohibitive. As noted by the 2007 DSB report 
titled Mission Impact of Foreign Influence on DOD Software,  
The problem of detecting vulnerabilities is deeply complex, and there is no 
silver bullet on the horizon. Once malicious code has been implanted by a 
capable adversary, it is unlikely to be detected by subsequent testing…. 
Current tools find about one third of the bugs prior to deployment that are 
ever found subsequently, and the rate of false positives is about equal to 
that of true positives. (Defense Science Board, 2007, p. ix) 
The problem of counterfeit parts is highly dynamic, yet the solutions proposed by 
Government entities are somewhat static. As noted earlier, the sophistication of the 
counterfeiters varies greatly and their tactics change often.   
The United States is behind the threat curve where this hardware to software 
crossroads occurs, as noted by the 2007 DSB report: 
From a defensive perspective, microelectronics and its associated software 
cannot be separated. While the offense may be able to attack either and 
meet operational objectives, the defense must be prepared for the offense 
to attack at the seam of the software and hardware. If this offensive 
approach is done well and the defense examines the software and 
hardware only as independent elements, the offense is likely to go 
unnoticed until too late. (Defense Science Board, 2007, p. 4) 
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Launching the Defense Acquisition Reform Initiative in 1997, SECDEF Cohen 
accelerated the move to Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) technology, which provided 
better capabilities to the warfighter, at a faster pace, and with less cost to the taxpayer. 
While all of these benefits were realized in one way or another, product integration and 
parts obsolescence became increasingly problematic. Technology development in the 
commercial sector far outpaced the DOD‘s ability to react, and parts that were required 
for COTS-based systems became harder to acquire.   
Manufacturing was moved off-shore in order to capitalize on favorable market 
conditions, low labor costs, and low market entry costs. According to the 2005 DSB 
Report:  
Pressure on U.S. IC suppliers for high return on invested capital has 
compelled them to outsource capital intensive manufacturing 
operations.  Thus, the past decade has seen an accelerating trend towards 
vertical disaggregation in the semiconductor business.  Companies whose 
manufacturing operations once encompassed the full range of integrated 
circuit activities from product definition to design and process 
development, to mask-making and chip fabrication, to assembly and final 
test and customer support, even materials and production equipment, are 
contracting out nearly all these essential activities. (Defense Science 
Board, 2005, p. 4) 
This outsourcing, while extremely dangerous to the integrity of the United States 
microchip supply, is a natural outgrowth of globalization. Rather than trying to reverse 
the inevitable tide of continued globalization, the United States government needs to be 
intelligent about how the acquisition of electronics is managed.  
Ultimately, the problem of counterfeit parts in the DOD supply line is an issue of 
parts obsolescence. According to the Defense Microelectronics Activity (DMEA) director 
in 2008, ―The defense community is critically reliant on a technology that obsoletes itself 
every 18 months, (and) is made in unsecure locations over which we have absolutely no 
market share or influence‖ (Gillies, 2008, p. 1).   
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The steps being undertaken by DOD and Congress shift the responsibility for 
microelectronic parts pedigree to the contractor as the supplier of the electronic parts; but 
this policy does not address the continued need for DOD to acquire parts that are 
unavailable, obsolete, or otherwise hard to find.  
Parts obsolescence is inevitable in the modern military, but the means to deal with 
parts obsolescence can be found in the early phases of development. If consideration is 
given to life cycle management and technology refresh, then future problems can be 




Statutory measures designed to stem the flow of counterfeit electronic parts into 
the DOD supply chain are not effective at curbing the threat, which evolves more rapidly 
than both our controls, and the systems into which these threats are introduced. Current 
counterfeit parts control measures are designed to identify counterfeit parts after they 
have reached the customer, rather than closing the holes in the supply chain. Existing 
policy is inadequate in addressing the underlying economic, technological, and 
implementation issues that underpin the counterfeit parts problem. A joint government 
and industry approach is required in order to more effectively control this issue and 
ensure the quality and authenticity of electronic parts. Additionally, DOD should more 
consistently apply the system acquisition framework in ways that aid in the identification 
and accommodation of obsolescence, refresh, and service life extension concerns. 
Recommended areas for further investigation and potential strategies for mitigating the 
threat are identified below. 
B. AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
 Greater government oversight through the development of a new 
agency:  
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), a subordinate agency 
of the Department of Commerce, does provide guidance and suggestions on supply chain 
risk management and the identification of counterfeit electronic parts; however, there is 
no overriding government agency that is wholly dedicated to supply chain risk 
management and counterfeit parts mitigation.   
The solutions outlined in the conclusions above all touch on a piece of the 
counterfeit parts problem, but they are disjointed and do not represent an integrated effort 
to combat a problem that has been steadily growing over time. The primary tracking 
system for counterfeits, GIDEP, is a system that was created for another purpose, and is 
being used for lack of an appreciable alternative.   
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A government agency or service, perhaps an element of the Department of 
Commerce, could set acceptance standards, consolidate tracking and monitoring efforts, 
and strive to adequately keep ahead of this highly dynamic problem. If correctly 
implemented and supported, such a service would have the resources and authority to 
concentrate its efforts on the latest counterfeiting techniques, and could provide real-time 
counterfeiting threat data through a variety of sources, which, if classified, would help to 
prevent compromise of any ongoing investigations. This service could also provide a 
database, whose sole purpose is the reliable conveyance of information pertaining to 
counterfeit parts.   
A 2010 GAO Report noted the lack of government oversight, policy, or processes 
to prevent counterfeit parts. Also noted in that report was the fact that the DOD is limited 
in their ability to fully scope the problem (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 
2010).  As of 2010, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), which supplies the DOD with 
most of its spare parts, neither consistently reported nor maintained a list of instances 
where counterfeit parts were found. A dedicated agency would provide the much needed 
oversight and verification of industry‘s compliance with statutory measures. Such an 
organization could provide authentication and validation of sites that have been 
accredited through the DMEA process, and would identify solutions to keep critical 
electronics flowing to the military. 
The drawback of this solution would be the requirements that are imposed upon a 
government entity. Reports to Congress, requests for information, and other high level 
products that are required by a government entity will all mire this agency in 
administrative requirements, which will reduce their effectiveness and ability to quickly 
react to threats. Additionally, due to freedom of information act requests, it is possible 
that their active investigations could become public, thereby reducing their effectiveness.    
 Greater collaboration with industry 
The solutions provided by the government put the bulk of the reporting 
responsibility on the contractor. This is a fundamental flaw; industry has a similar vested 
interest in the identification and prevention of counterfeit electronics as government. The 
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reputation of the contractor, in addition to the possible negative reaction of shareholders 
all affects the bottom line of a company that provides electronic parts to the government.   
It is incumbent upon the government to work collaboratively with industry, vice 
antagonistically. Traditionally, industry is quicker to identify problems in their supply 
lines, and more agile in the implementation of solutions. Given that, industry has been 
dealing with counterfeit parts for years and has devised and implemented solutions to 
protect its supply chain. United States companies may design technology domestically 
but outsource production overseas, while maintaining strict performance standards for 
their products.  
Industry has already made solutions that bridge the hardware/software gap as 
well. According to an EDN Network article titled Advanced Security Prevents 
Counterfeit Products, industry is already using asymmetric cryptography, the core 
technology behind digital signatures, to secure online transactions and ensure 
confirmation of product originality. When a printer, for example, leaves the assembly 
line, it is given a particular radio frequency identification (RFID). Upon the use of that 
printer, the RFID is checked to ensure it is a valid platform, and will not work if the 
RFID is not confirmed to be valid (Richetto, 2011).  
Greater collaboration with industry would also help with one of the primary 
drivers of counterfeit electronics, the electronic recycling market. At the end of a product 
life cycle, the device or platform cannot simply be shipped off to an unseen entity; the 
government should be working together with industry to identify solutions to life cycle 
management issues. Establishing a strong electronics recycling industry in the United 
States could be profitable for industry, and beneficial for government.  
 Counterfeit parts controls in the system acquisition process 
Technology refresh (TR), is defined as ―the periodic replacement of both custom-
built and COTS system components, within a larger DOD weapon system, to assure 
continued supportability throughout its life cycle (Defense Acquisition University, 
2014).‖  Rather than employing a full DOD 5000 series acquisition for technology refresh 
(TR), system requirements must be structured dynamically, to accommodate capability 
insertion needs within existing weapon systems throughout their service life. The 
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framework for this begins in the early stages of system development. DOD must apply 
considerations for counterfeit parts controls as early as possible in system requirements, 
specifically in draft Capabilities Development Document (CDD) development during the 
Materiel Solution Analysis phase of system acquisition. When writing system hardware 
requirements, consideration should be given to the backwards compatibility that will be 
required for integrated circuits and discrete electronics. Much of the counterfeit parts 
problem can be traced to a product life cycle that has been extended well beyond its 
anticipated service life, especially when there has been no consideration given to TR. 
This should also be considered during development of the system‘s Life-Cycle 
Sustainment Plan, which should include standard considerations for TR. 
Ideally, each weapon system will have a significantly increased service life by 
providing new technology insertions. When performed correctly, TR ensures long term 
weapon system availability, and reduces the impacts of diminishing manufacturing 
sources (Defense Acquisition University, 2014). However, there is no specific DOD 
policy on how to structure a TR program; therefore, each element of the DOD is applying 
this differently based on their specific requirements. The CDD and Life-Cycle 
Sustainment Plan are tools that can aid in the consistent application of counterfeit parts 
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